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Free Speech, the Private Employee, and
State Constitutions
All too frequently, individual employees who express personal political
views obnoxious to their employeis are discharged from their jobs or sub-
jected to other forms of retaliation.' Federal constitutional guarantees pro-
tect public employees, but do not extend to workers in the private sector.
Moreover, the National Labor Relations Act and analogous state legisla-
tion protect only unionized private employees, and only when those em-
ployees engage in "concerted activities." Although common-law remedies
for wrongful discharge have been adopted in some states, these very lim-
ited remedies do not explicitly protect free expression.2
This Note argues that free expression by nonunion employees in the
private sector is increasingly threatened and requires greater protection.
While acknowledging competing constitutional values and policy objec-
tions, it concludes that protection of employee speech in proper circum-
stances is essential to our system of free expression and that, in the ab-
sence of federal judicial willingness to intervene in the employment
relationship, the linguistically broad free speech provisions of state consti-
tutions provide a means for such protection. After analyzing competing
concerns, the Note suggests two circumstances in which protection of em-
ployee speech is inappropriate and describes factors state courts should
1. Several authors have argued that increased employee protection against arbitrary employer ac-
tion in general is overdue. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting
the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Blumberg, Corporate
Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24 OKLA.
L. REV. 279 (1971). This Note contributes to that discussion by arguing that the values underlying
the system of free expression require such protection. The Note differs from these earlier works by
proposing state constitutional guarantees, rather than common law or statutory reforms, as a basis for
protection of employee speech. Earlier authors have debated whether employee protection is possible
through federal constitutional interpretation. Compare Berle, Constitutional Limitations on Corporate
Activity-Protection of Personal Rights from Invasion Through Economic Power, 100 U. PA. L. REV.
933 (1952) (predicting trend toward such protection through Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments) with
Wellington, The Constitution, the Labor Union and "Governmental Action", 70 YALE L.J. 345
(1961) (arguing against it). None has analyzed the potential of state constitutions for guaranteeing
employee free expression.
2. The term "expressive activity" as used in this Note refers to nonviolent, noncoercive, direct
communication between individuals, including but not limited to mass audiences. See Baker, Scope of
the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 964, 990-96 (1978); see generally T.
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970).
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weigh in deciding the remainder of cases involving the speech of private
employees.
I. Freedom of Expression and the Employment Relationship
Although some employees are currently protected against employer re-
taliation, these protections are inadequate. Political speech by an em-
ployee, the paradigmatic case, remains unprotected from employer
reprisal.
A. Existing Guarantees
Many employees already enjoy protection against employer abridgment
of speech. Since 1968, the First Amendment 3 has been interpreted to pro-
tect the right of public employees to comment on matters of either public
or private concern.' This protection extends to both federal and state em-
ployees,' as well as to those employed by entities sufficiently connected
with government that their actions qualify as state action.'
State and federal labor laws provide additional protection. Section 7 of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)7 protects employee speech
from abridgment by employers when employees are engaged in "concerted
activities" for "mutual aid or protection."' Although the "concerted activi-
3. U.S. Const. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
.") The Supreme Court applied the First Amendment protection of free speech to the states in
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("liberty" protected by due process clause of Four-
teenth Amendment includes freedom of expression).
4. Prior to 1968, public employees were not guaranteed freedom of expression. See McAuliffe v.
Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892) (Holmes, J.) (plaintiff has
right to express himself but "no constitutional right to be a policeman"). Pickering v. Board of Educ,
391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), held that public employees may not be required to relinquish First Amend-
ment rights in order to enjoy public employment. The Court adopted a balancing test, weighing the
employer's interest in efficiency against the employee's interest in free expression. Pickering has re-
cently been applied to expressions of opinion in private encounters. See Givhan v. Western Line
Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979) (unanimous) (expression of public employee's views in
private encounters with employer not beyond constitutional protection). Pickering and Givhan both
involved state employees. Similar protection has been found for federal employees, see Singer v.
United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 429 U.S. 1034 (1977) (summarily vacating lower court affirmance,
reported at 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976), of dismissal of EEOC secretary for off-duty advocacy of
homosexuality), and for municipal employees, see Bickel v. Burkhart, 462 F. Supp. 682, 684 (N.D.
Tex. 1978) (finding First Amendment protection for local fireman).
5. See supra note 4.
6. Two tests for state action have been used by courts: the public function test and the significant
state involvement test. The latter has been narrowed by requiring a "close nexus" between govern-
mental and challenged activity. For a summary of the doctrines, see Note, Creditors' Remedies as
State Action, 89 YALE L.J. 538, 540-45 (1980).
7. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1976).
8. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. . . ." 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as § 7]. While Congress may have initially passed the § 7
protections to promote collective bargaining rather than to extend free speech guarantees to organized
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ties" limitation of section 7 was once defined to apply only to disputes
between employees and their employer, recent case law interprets it to
apply to any speech with sufficient relation to employee group interests.'
These free speech rights are considered "fundamental,"'" and may not be
bargained away by union representatives in contract negotiations."
Twenty-three states have enacted similar provisions."
Several states have also enacted legislation to protect the political activi-
ties of employees. Such laws prohibit employers from, for example, reduc-
tion of an employee's wages or dismissal in order to influence her vote,' 3
interference with an employee's "engaging in politics or becoming a can-
didate,"' 4 or discrimination against an employee on the basis of her "polit-
ical activities or affiliations."'"
private employees, judicial use of First Amendment doctrine to interpret § 7 has produced the latter
result. See Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803 (1945) (affirming NLRB presump-
tions for protected speech); Lynd, Employee Speech in the Private and Public Workplace: Two Doc-
trines or One?, I INDUS. REL. L.J. 711, 713-20 (1977) (showing NLRB presumptions based upon
First Amendment doctrine).
9. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 564-65 (1978) (finding distribution of newsletter contain-
ing lobbying news on pro-labor legislation protected under § 7). Eastex indicated that, at some point,
the relationship between the employees' speech and work would probably become "so attenuated" that
protection would not be appropriate, but the Court declined to define that point. Id. at 568. Cf. Ford
Motor Co., 221 NLRB 663, 666 (1975), enforced, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976) (cited in Eastex)
(holding distribution on employer's premises of a "purely political tract" unprotected even though
election of any political candiate ultimately might affect employment conditions).
10. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
11. NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974). The NLRB has applied this holding as
if it "prohibits the waiver of the right to distribute literature connected with any activity protected by
section 7." Lynd, supra note 8, at 724-25. These rights may therefore be characterized as quasi-
constitutional. Id. at 726.
12. Each of the state statutes protects other "concerted activities . . for mutual aid and protec-
tion" in language identical to the federal statute. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-106 (1973); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 31-104 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 377-4 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 48-701 (1977)
(statement of public policy only, without enforcement provision); IND. CODE § 22-6-1-2 (1974) (state-
ment of public policy only, without enforcement provision); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-803 (1973); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:822 (West 1964) (statement of public policy only, without enforcement provi-
sion); MD. WORK, LAB. & EMPL. CODE ANN. art. 100, § 63 (1964); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
150A, § 3 (West 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 423.8 (1978); MINN. STAT. § 179.10 (1966); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 614.090 (1979) (statement of public policy only, without enforcement provision); N.Y.
LAB. LAW § 703 (McKinney 1977); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-12-02 (1980); OR. REV. STAT. § 663.110
(1979); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 211.5 (Purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-7-12 (1979); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 60-9A-2 (1978); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-20-7 (1974); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 1503 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 21-1A-3 (1981); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.04 (West 1974); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 27-7-101 (1977). Some states, such as Connecticut, have adopted state penalties for
violations of the NLRA. See Nelson, State Labor Legislation Enacted in 1980, Mo. LABOR REV.,
Jan. 1981, at 21,22 (listing states).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 56, § 33, (1978).
14. NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.040 (1979). See COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-108 (1973).
15. CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1101-1105 (West 1971). For a detailed analysis of California's statu-
tory protections, see Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1970). Although some statutes provide civil remedies for the employee, see, e.g.,
CAL. LABOR CODE § 1105 (West 1971) (private recovery not precluded); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.070
(1979) (private recovery allowed), others provide only criminal penalties, see, e.g., MO. REV. STAT.
§ 115.637(7) (Vernon 1966). For additional state statutes protecting political activities, see LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 23:961-62 (West 1964); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 210A.14 (West Supp. 1981); WIS. STAT.
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The common law also provides some protection. Nine states, following
New Hampshire's lead in 1974,6 now recognize a cause of action against
an employer for the tort of wrongful discharge. 7 Wrongful discharge has
been interpreted broadly as dismissal contrary to public policy and has
included, in some cases, dismissal resulting from an employee's expressive
activity."1
Current legal safeguards for freedom of expression, however, usually do
not protect the speech of nonunion workers employed in the private sec-
tor. 9 Under the most recent state-action tests, almost no private employer
is bound by the constraints of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 20
ANN. § 12.19 (West 1974).
16. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) (allowing damages for
employee discharged after refusing to engage in sexual relations with employer). Monge is regarded
as the seminal case, but there are earlier cases vindicating employee expressive rights. See Peterman v.
Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (allowing damages for employee
discharged by union for failure to testify falsely before legislative committee).
17. Those states are California, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania, Oregon, and West Virginia. See Note, Protecting the At Will Employee Against
Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816, 1817
nn.6-7, 1821 n.30, 1822 n.38 (1980) (listing cases). Connecticut also has adopted the doctrine. See
Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980). Three approaches to the
doctrine of wrongful discharge exist so far. Some states imply an employer's contractual duty to termi-
nate only in good faith, others impose tort obligations for abusive or retaliatory discharge, and still
others merely recognize a public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Note, supra, at
1821-24.
18. See Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (allowing recovery for
dismissal in retaliation for reporting bank illegalities to bank director). Most cases, however, do not
consider the needs of the system of free expression. See cases cited infra nn. 26-37.
19. The non-agricultural work force in 1976 numbered close to 80 million. Over 15 million were
employed by federal, state or local governments, and hence protected by the First Amendment. Close
to 21 million were unionized. Of those unionized, 95% were protected by grievance procedures, and
80% had won "good cause" clauses in their collective bargaining contracts. Thus, approximately 60-
65% of the non-agricultural work force, or about 48-52 million workers, were unprotected and termi-
nable at will. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1979).
This Note analyzes only protection for nonunion employees. For a discussion of the difficulties of
protecting free expression through arbitration, see Palmer, Free Speech and Arbitration: Implications
for the Future, 27 LAB. L.J. (1976), reprinted in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION 156, 170
(A. Westin & S. Salisbury eds. 1980) (suggesting that Supreme Court probably would deny to arbi-
trators the power finally to decide cases involving constitutional rights). But see J. GETMAN, LABOR
RELATIONS: LAW, PRACTICE AND POLICY 367-70 (1978) (arbitrators tend not to consider constitu-
tional issues). Although § 7 of the NLRA theoretically would protect individual speakers, courts
usually have interpreted "concerted activities" to require at least contemplation of group action. See,
e.g., Tri-State Truck Service v. NLRB, 616 F.2d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1980); NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet
Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Buddies Supermarkets, 481 F.2d 714, 718 (5th
Cir. 1973).
20. See Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Community Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102, 1109-10 (6th Cir.
1980) (employee complaint failed to state cause of action because agency was not engaged in federal
action at time of termination); Johnson v. Southwest Detroit Community Mental Health Serv., 462 F.
Supp. 166, 167, 171 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (finding neither sufficient nexus nor symbiotic relationship to
establish state action where non-profit agency receives 90% of its income from government, enjoys
state tax benefits given to non-profit corporations, is subject to extensive regulation by H.E.W. and by
corresponding state agency, and is subject to site visits by H.E.W.). But see Holodnak v. Avco Corp.,
514 F.2d 285, 288-89 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (finding sufficient government
involvement to apply First Amendment where nearly all of company's physical plant was owned by
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Statutes also provide little protection. Protection of speech under section 7
of the NLRA and analogous state laws does not apply to individual em-
ployees or to employees not acting to secure a group benefit.21 Moreover,
state "political activities" statutes apply only to electoral activities.2 2 Nor
does the developing common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge
comprehensively protect freedom of expression;23 thus far, it has been rec-
ognized by only nine states.24 All such nonconstitutional protections are, of
course, subject to legislative nullification.
B. Abridgment of Employee Expression by Private Employers
Despite existing guarantees, private employers have successfully re-
taliated against employees for expressive activities. Employees have been
dismissed, suspended, demoted, intimidated, and threatened with
nonadvancement because of their expressive activities.2 Expressive activi-
government and 80% of work was for Department of Defense, which maintained large contingent of
personnel on site to oversee operations).
21. See NLRB v. Dawson Cabinet Co., 566 F.2d 1079, 1082, 1084 (8th Cir. 1977) (worker
acting alone found unprotected). Section 7 does not protect managerial employees, including foremen.
See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 289 (1974). The speech must bear a fairly immedi-
ate relationship to employees' interests, see Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-568, n.18
(1978), and must be "inextricably linked with conduct" in order to qualify as "concerted activity,"
Lynd, supra note 8, at 712 n.3.
22. Most of the statutes appear in code chapters dealing with electoral activities. See, e.g., MASS.
GEN. LAWS. ANN. cl. 56, § 33 (1978); Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 115.637 (7) (Vernon 1966). Further,
at least one state has excluded Communists from such statutory protection. See Black v. Cutter Labo-
ratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 800-04, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert. dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956) (finding
Communist beliefs of employee to be defense against claim of wrongful discharge), c. Lockheed Air-
craft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 171 P.2d 21 (1946) (en banc) (statute does not prohibit
employer from requiring a loyalty test). Most states, including Massachusetts, Colorado, Missouri
and Louisiana, have not yet interpreted these statutes, although they were enacted for the most part in
the 1930's. For a criticism of California's statutory controls, among the most broadly worded, as too
weak and ineffectual, see Note, supra note 15.
23. The most common standard, that the discharge be contrary to public policy, is exceedingly
vague. None of the three standards, see supra note 17, requires or even suggests inquiry into the
effects on values underlying the protection of free speech. See Note, supra note 17, at 1821-24
(describing issues to be considered under standards).
24. See supra note 17 (listed states). At least four jurisdictions have refused to apply the doctrine.
See Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977) (per curiam) (rejecting doc-
trine because standard "against public policy" is too broad); Larson v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz.
507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that employer can fire anyone); Sargent v. Illinois
Inst. of Technology, 78 Il. App. 3d 117, 121-22, 397 N.E.2d 443, 445-46 (1979) (affirming rule of
termination at will despite predischarge hearing requirement of employee's manual); Scroghan v.
Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. Ky. 1977) (finding termination to be private rather
than public concern and deferring to legislature, which had not acted).
25. See, e.g., Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Community Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1980)
(laid off and offered lower status position); Harberson v. Monsanto Textiles Co., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec.
(CH) 111,586, at 7128 (D.S.C. 1976) (dismissed); Francis v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 55 F.R.D.
202 (D.D.C. 1972) (suspended, later dismissed; found protected under Title VII); Pierce v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 337-338, 340 (1979), rev'd, 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505
(1980) (constructive discharge found when resignation based on threatened nonadvancement); In re
Chalk, 441 Pa. 376, 379, n.1, 272 A.2d 457 (1971) (warned not to speak out); EEOC Decision No.
71-2040, May 12, 1971, summarized in Empl. Prac. Rptr. 622.5011 (duties reassigned). Most
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ties leading to such reprisals have included advocating Communism, 26 ad-
vocating homosexuality,27 filing grievances charging wrongdoing by super-
iors,28 writing letters critical of management to newspapers or government
agencies, 2 publishing an "underground" company newsletter,0 voicing
misgivings about product safety,3 announcing intentions of attending law
school at night,32 writing a novel,33 counseling a fellow employee of her
legal rights against the employer,34 criticizing a superior,35 implying a ra-
cial bias on the part of the employer,3 and advocating women's rights.
In almost every case, the employer prevailed against a court challenge.
reported cases involve discharge rather than other forms of retaliation. For examples of cases involving
employees who wished to differ publicly with their employers, see WHISTLE BLOWING: THE REPORT
OF THE CONFERENCE ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY 140-46 (R. Nader, P. Petkas & K. Blackwell
eds. 1972) (suspension); Id. at 152-54 (demotion).
26. See, e.g., Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. 2d 788, 800, 804, 278 P.2d 905 (1955), cert.
dismissed, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 2d 481, 485, 171
P.2d 21 (1946) (en banc) (employer engaged in producing vital war materials); Allure Shoe Corp. 138
N.L.R.B. 395, 406 (1962) ("pro-Castro" and "communistic" employees). Unless indicated, the em-
ployer prevailed in all cases cited infra at nn.26-37.
27. See, e.g., DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979); Smith v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th
Cir. 1977) (transsexual). But see Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 458,
595 P.2d 592, 156 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1979) (complaint stated cause of action under state constitution's
equal protection clause, state utility code, and state labor code protecting political activity).
28. See, e.g., Johnson v. Southwest Detroit Community Mental Health Serv., 462 F. Supp. 166
(E.D. Mich. 1978) (approached FBI agents to determine if actions of agency superiors violated fed-
eral law); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (complained to
superior about violations of state food and drug act; court reversed grant of employer's motion to
dismiss); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ct. App. Ind. 1979) (reported that immediate superior
was receiving kickbacks); Sargent v. Illinois Inst. of Technology, 78 Ill. App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443
(1979) (campus policeman filed grievance alleging "theft of services" by immediate superior who used
employer's property for personal purposes); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va.
1978) (reported supervisors procedural illegalities to bank director).
29. See, e.g., Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975)
(letter to weekly newspaper criticizing grievance procedure of employer and union); Percival v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 400 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (letter to corporate superior and to joint
venture partner of employer correcting 15 perceived errors in employer's newspaper ads); Abrisz v.
Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978) (letter to unemployment compensation board in
support of co-worker's claim criticizing employer practices).
30. See Ingram, The Corporate Underground, 213 THE NATION 206, 207-09 (1971) (description
of company reaction to such publications).
31. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (salesman criti-
cized product safety).
32. See Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. Ky. 1977).
33. See McIntyre v. E.I. DuPont, No. 954,904 (165th Judicial District Court, Harris Co., Texas,
1974).
34. See Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980) (personnel department em-
ployee counseled co-worker on perceived legal right to pregnancy benefits; disagreed with superior;
found protected under Tite VII).
35. See Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Community Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1980) (op-
posed election of executive director by board of directors); Heiskala v. Johnson Space Center Credit
Union, 474 F. Supp. 448 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (criticized managerial decisions, operations and proce-
dures); Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 8453, at 6350 (E.D. Mich. 1978)
(termination for unprofessional outburst).
36. See H.L. Meyer Co. v. NLRB, 426 F.2d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 1970) (employee implied racial
discrimination by employer against job applicant).
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While the above cases reflect a range of employer abridgment, the para-
digmatic reprisal occurs when an employee is engaged in political expres-
sive activity after working hours and off company property. For example,
an employee fired for speech critical of an incumbent President of the
United States, by an employer whose views differed, has no recourse from
or protection against such a reprisal.
Employees ordinarily cannot vindicate their rights by leaving their jobs.
To do so in the modern employment context, where more people than ever
before work for others,38 often entails the loss of pensions" and seniority."
Further, technological advances have increased employers' ability to dis-
37. EEOC Decision No. 73-0463, Jan. 19, 1973, summarized at Empl. Prac. Rptr. 1 566.11
(leader of women's rights committee who worked in personnel department and had access to confiden-
tial information discharged).
38. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 176, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974) ("We have
become a nation of employees.") (quoting F. TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1951)).
Further, more workers now work for very large corporations. The number of employees of the na-
tion's 500 largest manufacturing companies has risen in the last 25 years nearly three times as fast as
has the number of workers employed by the remainder of United States manufacturers. See Hayes,
Twenty-Five Years of Change in the Fortune 500, FORTUNE, May 5, 1980, at 88, 94 (chart). In
1980, over 4.6 million workers, or nearly 28.7% of all "Fortune 500" employees, were employed by
the top 20 "Fortune 500" manufacturers. Id.
39. Pension plans now cover well over half of the private sector labor force. P. DRUKER, THE
UNSEEN REVOLUTION: HOW PENSION FUND SOCIALISM CAME TO AMERICA 15 (1976). Employees
must usually work for the same employer for several years in order to vest in the plan. See Glendon
& Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20
B.C. L. REV. 457, 476-77 (1979). The federal government, with the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA), has encouraged formation of pension plans. ERISA preempted state statutes
requiring pension plans. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569-570 (1979)
(ERISA comprehensively governs use and terms of pension plans).
40. Seniority limits an employee's freedom to change jobs. Benefits such as regular increases in
pay, vacations, promotions, protection against layoffs, and priority in recall improve as seniority in-
creases. Glendon & Lev, supra, note 39 at 478-79. SeeJ. GETMAN, supra note 19, at 37, 181 (senior-
ity has been described as "soul" of collective bargaining agreement for unionized employees). Employ-
ees who change employers must ordinarily begin to accumulate seniority all over again. Glendon and
Lev point out that, while seniority is traditionally associated with collective bargaining, most "employ-
ers that have successfully resisted unionization often have done so by providing wages and benefits
equal to or better than their unionized counterparts." Glendon & Lev, supra note 39, at 478. Thus,
seniority has become a significant deterrent to changing jobs. See SUBCOMMITTEE ON FISCAL POLICY
OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, 93RD CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION, THE LABOR MARKET IMPACTS
OF THE PRIVATE RETIREMENT SYSTEM 67-71 (Comm. Print 1973) (number of annual quits per hun-
dred employees usually lower in establishments with pension plans); Flowers & Hughes, Why Em-
ployees Stay, HARV. BUS. REV., July-August 1973, at 49 (describing factors that promote job stability
despite increased dissatisfaction); Koludrubetz, Two Decades of Employee-Benefit Plans, 1950-1970:
A Review, SOC. SECURITY BULL., April 1972, at 10; Schiller & Weiss, The Impact of Private Pen-
sions on Firm Attachment, 61 REV. OF ECON. AND STATISTICS 369 (1979) (analyzing aspects of dif-
ferent plans).
Less tangible forces also tend to make job-changing difficult. Fear of, or inability to adapt to new
situations, particularly as a worker gets older, contribute to a lack of worker mobility. See Rosen,
Management Perception of Older Employees, MO. LAB. REV., May 1978, at 33 (older workers' fears
of discrimination are not unfounded because employers accept age stereotypes and believe that hiring
older workers will raise medical insurance premiums). See generally Hearings on Age Discrimination
in Employment Before Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). The job-seeking experience can itself be emotionally trying as well,
involving the potential for, if not the repeated incidence of, personal rejection.
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cover, monitor, and retrieve personal information about the beliefs and
opinions of individual workers. 4' Thus, employers now hold an unprece-
dented ability to coerce large numbers of employees' beliefs and opinions.
II. Balancing Employee Speech with Competing Employer Interests
The values underlying freedom of expression, together with the coercive
power of many employers, creates a situation which requires protection of
employee speech. Because such protection may restrict employer freedom,
however, a proper balance must be struck.
A. The Need for Free Expression in the Workplace
Democratic societies demand freedom of expression because it is essen-
tial to participation in decision-making by all members of society, individ-
ual self-fulfillment, the advancement of knowledge and the discovery of
truth, and maintenance of the proper balance between stability and
change.42 Inseparable from the ideal of freedom of expression is the pro-
41. Employers frequently make use of investigative agencies and information-gathering techniques
to acquire information concerning an employee's beliefs and activities. See, e.g., Francis v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., Long Lines Dept., 55 F.R.D. 202 (D.D.C. 1972) (on the job surveillance ordered
after employee filed discrimination charges against employer); EEOC Decision No. 70-683 (April 10,
1970), summarized at EmpI. Prac. Rptr. 564.47 (employer assigned plant guards to keep Spanish-
surnamed American employee under surveillance following employee's claims of job discrimination);
STAFF OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S.
SENATE, PRIVACY, POLYGRAPHS AND EMPLOYMENT, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (Comm. Print 1974)
(200,000 to 300,000 private business polygraph tests administered each year); Wall, What the Com-
petition Is Doing: Your Need to Know, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1974, at 22, 38 (39% of busi-
nesses surveyed admitted undercover operations, 38% admitted electronic surveillance, and 24% admit-
ted surreptitious locker checks, in efforts to stem employee leaks), see V. PACKARD, THE NAKED
SOCIETY 91-102 (1964) (discussing use of lie detectors and psychological evaluations); A. WESTIN,
PRIVACY AND THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP: A STUDY OF COMPUTER USE IN PERSONNEL ADMIN-
ISTRATION (forthcoming), excerpted in INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN THE CORPORATION, supra note 19, at
226, 229; Craver, The Inquisitorial Process in Private Employment, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28-64
(1977) (discussing employer's right to use lie detectors, searches, and surreptitious surveillance). See
generally F. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (1980). The increased availability of high-speed
information retrieval systems further threatens employee autonomy.
42. T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 6-7; T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 3-15 (1966). Some commentators and jurists have suggested that the value of self-
expression is paramount. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 804-05
(1978) (White, J., dissenting) (principal function of First Amendment "self-expression, self-realiza-
tion and self-fulfillment"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (emotive value of expression
often more important in overall message than cognitive content); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 578 (1978) (Meiklejohnian thesis that justifies protection of political speech is merely
intermediate step because one underlying purpose of state is to enhance personal growth and self-
realization); Baker, supra note 2, at 991 (self-fulfillment and participation are key values), c.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Those who won our
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties;
and that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued
liberty both as an end and as a means.")
Some commentators, however, believe that self-expression is not a value guaranteed by the First
Amendment and is unnecessary to a democratic society. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971). This view is decidedly in the minority. See
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tection of minorities43 whose ideas may be unpopular and who, by defini-
tion, are unable to protect themselves politically. 4" The advancement of
these values is threatened by the coercive power of private employers,
many of whom are now comparable to governments in size and intrusive
power.4 5 Even without the trend toward large-scale corporatism," modern
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L. REV. 422, 428 (1980) (sum-
marizing popular acceptance of underlying values). Those who deny the value of self-expression usu-
ally tend to limit free expression to speech concerning matters of public concern, such as politics. See
Bork, supra at 20 (no basis exists for judicial intervention to protect any speech but that which is
"explicitly political"). Limitations of free speech guarantees to political speech, however, are necessa-
rily tautological. Such limitations require definition of "political" speech. Political values are shaped
much, perhaps most, by events and contexts which are not electoral. To the extent that judges are part
of the contextual milieu, they cannot objectively-legitimately-define political speech. Moreover, the
paradigmatic case, see supra p. 528, involves speech which Bork would protect.
43. Employees are not a numerical minority in the United States, but proponants of unpopular
ideas are by definition in the minority. Although the term "minority" in Madison's time signified
political or regional minorities rather than racial, religious or ethnic minorities, see Cover, The Ori-
gins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. (1982) (forthcoming), intellec-
tual deviates who differ with their employers are comprehended by the term as Madison used it.
Workers as a group, possessed of smaller material wealth than employers, are likely to differ from
their employers as a group on some issues. See THE FEDERALIST. No. 10 Ui. Madison) (need to
protect against factions; most common, durable source of factions has been "the various and unequal
distribution of property"); Cover, supra, at n.3 (Madison's discussion of factions makes the point that
"[piroperty not only is itself an interest over which groups struggle, but it is an 'influence' on the
'sentiments and views' of its holders.") This difference cannot but influence electoral politics as well
as less organic values. See supra note 42 (political speech shaped by milieu).
The Madisonian model of minority rights has, however, been criticized by Robert Dahl, who ex-
posed its untestable assumptions. See R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 4-33 (1956)
("tyranny," inadequately defined yet central to theory, can be imposed by both majority and minor-
ity). Attractive to the empiricist, Dahl's approach ultimately has limited normative usefulness; even
pain cannot be proven bad. Neither pain nor tyranny, of course, can be objectively defined or de-
scribed. A more useful, if only historically available definition of tyranny comes from Robert Cover.
See Cover, supra ("Each constitutional generation organizes itself about paradigmatic events and
texts. For my generation it is clear that the events are Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil
Rights Movement. The text is footnote four (of Carolene Products).") Cf Fiss, Forward: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8, 15, 17 (1979) (footnote four radically incomplete; no discernable
connection exists between majoritarianism and the meaning of a constitutional value).
44. Cf J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 100-101, 103 (1980) (where majoritarian institutions
fail to protect minority rights, judicial intervention is justified). Ely relies on the Madisonian model.
,See id., at 7-8, 80. Although he nowhere defines the term minority, he explicitly includes dissenting or
different individuals in his conception of the term, see id. at 178. See also id. at 76 (despite influence
of footnote four, it has not been adequately elaborated).
45. The notion of a large corporation as a government becomes less remote when one examines
the numbers of employees involved. The thirteen largest U.S. corporations in 1981 employed over
5,867,700 workers. FORBES, May 11, 1981, at p. 299 (chart). The 1800 census of the United States
counted only 5,308,483 people. I U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES 8 (1975) (table: Series A 1-5). The resemblance has been noted extensively by com-
mentators. See, e.g., A. MILLER, THE MODERN CORPORATE STATE (1975) (large corporations are
private governments; constitution should reach them); Blumberg, supra note 1, at 299 (reasons for
viewing large corporations as political institutions).
46. Political scientists have suggested that the United States and the nations of Western Europe
are now in large part "corporatist" societies, in which government's objectives'are carried out by
private institutions. See R. HARRISON, PLURALISM AND CORPORATISM (1980), df. R. HEILBRONER,
BUSINESS CIVILIZATION IN DECLINE 34, 73 (1976) (next phase of capitalism must be increasingly
planned system; drift of business society will be toward business-government state; hierarchies, bu-
reaucracies and trend toward concentrate economic power likely to continue in post-industrial society).
Pluralism, which protests governmental intervention in private associations, has long been under
Employee Speech
employers can significantly impede the goals promoted by free expression.
It might be argued that this impediment is minimal because the employee
need only reserve expressive activity for nonworking hours or resign and
find a more sympathetic employer. Employers, however, often successfully
impose restrictions on employee activities even beyond working hours."'
Moreover, geographic restraints and specialized skills limit the ability of
an employee to find comparable work elsewhere, particularly if sympa-
thetic employers are rare.4"
attack as a model for democratic theory. See P. BACHRACH, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC ELITISM
83-92 (1967). Although pluralism may occasionally still function to protect non-majoritarian interests,
see J. ELY, supra note 44, at 135 (relying on that assumption), its strength to protest governmental
interference in non-governmental institutions is seriously weakened. A corporatist model, conversely,
requires such interference to protect individual rights. Japan, the paradigmatic corporatist state, and
Japanese industry are increasingly an enviable model for American business managers. See W.
OUCHI, THEORY Z 74-79 (1981) (Japanese model of company resists deviance in all forms; is greatly
sexist and rascist; model applied in America less intolerant of heterogeneity but tendency is still to-
ward sameness). Moreover, some leaders of large businesses have openly endorsed the nation-corpora-
tion as an improvement over, and an alternative to, the nation-state. See R. BARNET & R. MULLER,
GLOBAL REACH 56 (1974) (remarks of A.W. Clausen, president of Bank of America).
The increased potential for employer coercion of employees has not gone unnoticed. See Bazelon,
Civil Liberties-Protecting Old Values in the New Century, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 505, 512 (1976)
("With the advent of huge corporations, powerful unions and sophisticated technology, government no
longer holds a monopoly on the power to invade liberty on a massive scale."); Wellington, supra note
1, at 348 ("Unions and corporations have an importance in our lives which the founding fathers
would have thought possible only of government itself.").
47. See, e.g., Aebisher v. Ryan, 622 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing chilling effect of
public employer's coercive force on employee's speech); In re Chalk, 441 Pa. 376, 379 n.1, 272 A.2d
457, 458, n.1 (1971) (housing authority warns employees, who were to appear as private individuals
at meeting of tenants to urge lawful tenant action, that they must not "embarrass" the authority; court
finds activity protected); EEOC Decision No. 73-0463, Jan. 19, 1973, summarized at Empl. Prac.
Rptr. 1 566.11 (personnel department employee successfully fired for work as leader of women's
rights committee because of access to confidential personnel information); EEOC Decision No. 71-
1850, April 21, 1971, summarized at Empl. Prac. Rptr. 566.10 (labor union successfully discharges
organizer for participation in demonstrations against what she believed to be racially discriminatory
employment practices). The chilling effect of a threat of discharge has been recognized in the public
employee context. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968) ("potent means of
inhibiting speech"); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 (1967) (chilling effect of "intri-
cate administrative machinery").
48. The ability of employers to band together to exclude from work the adherents of certain
ideologies has been amply demonstrated. See I REPORT ON BLACKLISTING 126, 130 (J. Cogley ed.
1956) (employer use of private loyalty boards to determine non-Communism of job applicants); 2 id.
15-19 (same); c. N.D. CONST., art. XII § 17 (prohibiting blacklisting). The assumption that citizens
merely need reserve expressive activity for some other place was rejected by the Supreme Court when
it struck down restrictions on expression imposed by municipalities, Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939), and by owners of company towns, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-10, 504 n.l
(1946). Thus, the existence of an alternative means of communication cannot justify government fore-
closure of a particular chosen means. "[O]ne is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in
appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147, 162-165, 163 (1939). Municipal residents were not prevented from travelling to
other towns to express themselves, yet the Court recognized that municipalities may not restrict free
speech. This holding is consistent with the theory that because "exit" from a town is sufficiently
difficult, voice must be allowed within it.
Although these cases traditionally are cited as support for the doctrine of overbreadth, they rely on
an assumption central to liberal democracy, i.e., illegitimate authority-authority tolerated despite its
departure from liberal democratic tenets-is to be narrowly tolerated only to the extent that it is
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Freedom of expression operates as a system of underlying values, legal
rules, and enforcing institutions.49 The ability of the employer to abridge
deeply the expressive rights of large numbers of employees, heightened by
the increased economic and social dependence of the employee on her job0
and by the typical imbalance in the employer-employee bargaining posi-
tions,"1 seriously weakens this system.s2 On this basis, 3 governmental pro-
tection of employee speech in the private sector is both justified and
essential.1
4
justified by a desireable goal unachieveable within those tenets. See Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496,
514, 516 (1939) (opinion of Roberts, J.) (crucial issue whether officer or representative of state,
clothed with authority of state, misuses his power); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (unan-
imous) (ordinance invalid on face because not restricted in its application with respect to time and
place); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-05, 504 n. 1 (following Lovell and Hague line of cases
to find First Amendment prohibits abridgment of speech by owners of a company town).
49. See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 4 (overall unity of purpose and operation).
50. See supra notes 38-40.
51. See supra notes 45-48.
52. To fail to extend free speech protections to certain portions of the private sector is seriously to
undermine those protections. "A system of freedom of expression that allowed private bureaucracies to
throttle all internal discussion of their affairs would be seriously deficient." T. EMERSON, supra note
2, at 677. See also id. at 564, 632. "Participation in public controversy involving the employer through
the exercise of free speech presents the most appealing case for extension of employee rights."
Blumberg, supra note 1, at 311. See also Wellington, infra note 104.
53. The importance of extending majoritarian democratic ideals to the often self-contained society
of the workplace is implicit in the policy goals of the NLRA. Summers, Industrial Democracy:
America's Unfulfilled Promise, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 33-34 (1979) (expectation and promise of
Wagner Act was system of industrial democracy); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (policy goals). The recent
Congressional treatment of Employee Stock Ownership Plans, although recognized as a "technique of
corporate finance," I.R.S. Rev. Ruling 79-122, 1979-1, C.B. 204, 206, primarily reflects concern for
industrial democracy. See Granados, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: An Analysis of Current Re-
form Proposals, 14 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 15, 16-18, 20 (1980) (describing other examples of preferen-
tial treatment). Just as in democracy at large, democracy in the workplace depends upon freedom of
expression, even when that expression is not directly linked to the election of representatives.
[V]oluntary associations in our society tend to become, for all practical purposes, private gov-
ernments. They grow into large, impersonal, bureaucratic machines, possessing an identity and
life of their own. When this happens, the single member has no power by himself, and can
exercise his influence only in common with others through the elaborate organizational ma-
chinery. In this situation the members of a voluntary association have the same need for free-
dom of expression as they do vis-a-vis the formal government. The function of a system of
freedom of expression within such a private center of power is much the same as it is in the
broader society.
T. EMERSON, supra note 2 at 676, cf Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103 (1940) ("Free discus-
sion concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to us indispensable
to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of
modern industrial society."); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 381 F. Supp. 191, 204 (D. Conn. 1974), afl'd,
514 F.2d 285 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975) (citing passage from Thornhill). Indeed, the
level of citizen participation in democracy at large may be significantly affected by workers' opportu-
nities to participate in democracy in the workplace. See C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMO-
CRATIC THEORY 107-111 (1970); Conover, The Case for Participatory Management, in ANTICIPA-
TORY DEMOCRACY: PEOPLE IN THE POLITICS OF THE FUTURE 195 (C. Bezold ed. 1978).
54. The ability to "exit" legitimates hierarchical bureaucracy in a liberal democracy. By exiting,
individuals can avoid unwanted authority merely by removing themselves from its sphere of influence.
See L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA 64-65 (1955) (founders of United States were
escaping from oppressive environment). When exit from a sphere of influence is sufficiently difficult,
other characteristics are required to legitimate the authority. C R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND
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B. Objections to Protection of Employee Speech
Governmental protection of employee speech may infringe upon em-
ployers' rights of property, freedom of expression, and privacy."5 Analysis
both of constitutional doctrine defining these rights and of related policy
considerations helps to shape the appropriate limits of employee speech
protection.
1. Employer's Property Rights
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit government from tak-
ing private property for public use without just compensation. 6 Three of
the "sticks" in the "bundle" of an owner-employer's protected property
UTOPIA 297-309 (1974) (the only moral state is minimalist association of like-valued individuals;
citizens should choose states which asymptotically approximate their values); supra note 48. Freedom
of speech and conscience is a necessary if not sufficient condition for such legitimation. Compare J.
ELY, supra note 44, at 178-79 (tradition of exit is not strong enough to be a constitutional right, but
dissenter for whom attempts at persuasion are unavailing should have a constitutional right to travel
to find a more compatible majority, because majority appropriately chooses values), with Hirschman,
Exit, Voice & Loyalty: Further Reflections and a Survey of Recent Contributions, 1 SOC. SCIENCE
INFORMATION 7 (1974) reprinted in 58 MILLBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q./ HEALTH & SOCIETY 430,
444 (1980)(where both freedom of speech and exit are curbed, repression must occur).
55. Because the employment relationship is essentially contractual, it might be argued that gov-
ernmental protection of employee speech would also violate the contracts clause, U.S. CONST., art. I,
§ 10, cI. 1 ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .... ")
Once thought to be eclipsed by the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the clause
has been recently revived. See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241, 251 (1978)
(declaring contracts clause "not a dead letter" and invalidating Minnesota law requiring certain em-
ployers to provide pension coverage). The contracts clause, however, does not represent a significant
barrier to free speech protection. A court encountering a contracts clause question first should consider
whether the state has substantially impaired the contractual relationship. Id. at 244. "The severity of
the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation must clear." Id. at 245. The
state may impose conditions upon contractual relations, but these conditions must be reasonable in
light of the severity of the impairment and of the public purpose justifying their adoption. Id. More-
over, the state must be responding to an important social problem, id. at 247, in a way that protects a
broad societal interest rather than the interest of a favored group, id. at 249. The Court has viewed
with disfavor laws which "operate in an area [not] subject to state regulation at the time the...
contractual obligations were originally undertaken . . . ." Id. at 250.
While protection of employee speech would limit the employer's contractual freedom by denying
her the right to terminate an employee for any reason, the limitation would not be substantial, for the
grant of protection would eliminate only one among many reasons for termination. Furthermore,
protection of expressive rights is of broad societal interest, and private abridgment is an important
social problem for which governmental protection is reasonable and appropriate. Finally, state and
federal labor and civil rights legislation and regulation already pervades the area of employee
discharge.
56. U.S. CONST. amend. 5 ("No person shall. . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.");
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .") Though the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted in 1868, it was not until 1897 that the takings clause was applied to the states through the
due process clause. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897). The prohibition
against taking private property was the first of the federal prohibitions to apply to the states; in 1925,
freedom of speech became the second. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493 (1977).
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rights 7 are implicated by governmental protection of employee speech: an
interest in the determination of how property is used, an interest in the
ability to exclude others from its use, and an interest in the current and
potential value of the property."8 It might be argued that protection of
employee speech would substantially impair these interests and thus con-
stitute an unlawful taking.
Whether or not a taking has occurred depends on the aggregate effect of
the governmental action. 9 State abridgment of the right to exclude is not a
taking when the value or use of property is not substantially impaired and
when the owner may impose reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions on her property. 6 When an employee has obeyed all reasonable em-
ployer regulations, government may limit an employer's right totally to
bar expressive activity without violating the Fifth Amendment.6 ' Speech
occurring outside company property cannot, by definition, impair the use
of the employer's property, though it might impair the value.
Even if employee speech, regardless of location, affects the value of
property by damaging sales, stock prices or the employer's reputation, it
still need not constitute a proscribed taking. Governmental action that re-
sults in declines in value of up to 75% have been found constitutional in
some cases, 62 and complaints of lost potential profits, in particular, have
constituted weak takings claims.63 The aggregate effect of a substantial
loss of value, together with a partial loss of the right of exclude, however,
57. Property rights protected by the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment include an entire
"group of rights inhering in the citizen's [ownership]." Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447
U.S. 74, 82 n.6 (1980) (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78
(1945)).
58. Id. (ownership includes rights to "possess, use or dispose of" property); Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-180 (1979) (right to exclude).
59. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (finding no taking because
petitioning at shopping center will not unreasonably impair value or use of property); Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960) (not every destruction or injury to property is a taking in the
constitutional sense); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (aggregate of impairments must be
viewed in its entirety); Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1230-33 (1967) (test asks whether
governmental measure deprived claimant of "some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, invest-
ment-backed expectation").
60. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
61. Id. at 82-85.
62. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) (reduction in value of property not necessarily a
"taking"); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) (magnitude of diminution of value
no longer centrally determinative, proper procedure is to balance it against public purpose being
served); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (loss of 75% of total value not a
"taking"); Hadacheck v. Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (denying recovery to plaintiff who alleged
diminution of 87.5%); L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 461 n.3 (1978) (even loss of 75% may not be a
"taking").
63. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("loss of future profits-unaccompanied by any
physical property restriction-provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim"); c. Fuller
& Purdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56-57, 59 (1936)
(anticipated gains viewed as less compelling than other property interests).
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could result in a taking." Thus, a government seeking to protect employee
speech must consider any loss of property value to the employer resulting
from the speech.
Two of the most important values underlying the takings clause are
that property should not be taken by the government for any but public
purposes, and that the costs of improving the public welfare should not be
borne by a few to benefit the many.6 The protection of employee speech
need not significantly endanger these values. Freedom of speech is clearly
a public good." Though employers may be "few" among society at
large, 7 they will be able in most cases to pass along to consumers any
additional costs. A test that considers the employer's loss of property rights
and allows reasonable time, place and manner restrictions on employee
speech can adequately protect employers from any unreasonable burden.
Also underlying the protection of the individual employer's property
rights is society's concern for worker productivity. Restricting employer
prerogatives, it is argued, will not only weaken productivity but contribute
to a decline in the quality of goods and services as firms are forced to
retain non-productive workers. This concern, however, does not mandate
limits on the protection of employee speech beyond those imposed by the
employer's constitutional property rights.
Prohibiting employer retaliation need not adversely affect productivity
or product quality. Many instances of employer retaliation against em-
ployee speech involve situations posing no threat to productive efficiency.68
Employee protection from such retaliation may actually improve produc-
tivity in the. long run.69 Employees who are protected against arbitrary
64. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (right to exclude may be
essential to use or economic value).
65. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960); L. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 463;
Michelman, supra note 59, at 1218-24. The latter value invites examination of the size of the benefit
and the concentration of the cost. Thus, the Supreme Court has adopted a balancing test for evaluat-
ing takings claims. A small cost, even if borne by only a few, would interfere minimally with this
value.
66. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85 (1980) (state's asserted interest in
expansive free speech and petition rights meets due process test for real and substantial relation to
objective sought).
67. Some employers may actually represent a large group of investors and thus more closely re-
semble "many" than "few."
68. Many dismissals result from challenges to the perceived authority of the employer rather than
from challenges to productivity. See D. EWING, FREEDOM INSIDE THE ORGANIZATION: BRINGING
CIVIL LIBERTIES TO THE WORKPLACE 94 (1977) (greatest management fear is perceived threat to
hierarchy of power). For examples of cases where non-productivity reasons for dismissal were cited,
see supra pp. 527-28. A rule that permits an employer to discharge an employee whose speech seri-
ously interferes with productivity would avoid any significant economic damage to the employer. See
Note, supra note 17, at 1835.
69. See Note, supra note 17, at 1835. Indeed, several corporations have begun to encourage free
speech voluntarily. See D. EWING, supra note 68, at 95-96 (describing corporate endorsement of
"gripe sessions," critical team reviews, and anonymous telephone and card systems).
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dismissal-that is, dismissal unrelated to productive efficiency--have re-
duced rates of absenteeism, turnover and sabotage."0 Germany, England,
Sweden and France, apparently without damage to their economies, have
already limited employer prerogatives to terminate employees."
The common law rule of termination at will 2 is indefensible even on
pure efficiency grounds. It does not accurately reflect the bargain that
most parties would have struck had they negotiated a complete employ-
ment contract. Due to the high transaction costs of bargaining for each
employee's contract and the high costs to the employee of obtaining the
information necessary to perceive the true value of protection, failure to
negotiate these terms is to be expected. 3 Because employees bear most
risks of termination, employers have little incentive under the termination
at will rule to avoid unjustified dismissals, including those that represent
retaliation against employee speech.7
70. See SPECIAL TASK FORCE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, WORK IN
AMERICA 98-102 (1972) (summarizing findings of worker participation innovations); C. PATEMAN,
supra note 53, at 90-91 (Yugoslavian system of worker participation not been hindrance to economic
expansion; may have contributed, with other factors, to sizeable growth rate).
71. See A. SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM 113-114 (1965) (restrictions on European em-
ployer's freedom to dismiss); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a
Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508-19 (1976) (listing foreign provisions); see generally Kahn-Freund,
Labor Law and Social Security, in 1 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET:
A LEGAL PROFILE (E. Stein & T. Nicholson eds. 1960) (development in Europe). Japan has also
adopted job security provisions. See Note, supra 17, at 1836 n.105 (citing Japanese law).
72. The earliest articulation of the termination at will rule appeared in an 1877 treatise on
Master and Servant. Glendon & Lev, supra note 39 at 458. The rule assumes that employer and
employee possess equal bargaining power in negotiating an employment contract and provides that,
where no termination clause is explicitly agreed upon, the employment relationship can be ended at
any time by either party. The rule enjoyed almost unanimous judicial popularity in the early part of
the century. See Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-176 (1908) (mutuality of employment
relationship). For histories of the rule, see Glendon & Lev, supra note 39, at 457-61; Note, supra note
17 at 1824-28. For a history of the rule in Germany, France, England and Sweden, see Summers,
supra note 71, at 508-19. The rule has been severely criticized by commentators. See note 1, supra
(Blades, Blumberg).
73. See Note, supra note 17, at 1830-33. Because "contract bargaining will yield optimal alloca-
tions of risks only when the costs of negotiating and of gathering information are negligible; . . .
[these] barriers produce nonoptimal allocations (of risks)." Id. at 1830 n.80. In the context of collective
bargaining, these terms actually are negotiated and usually result in "just cause" clauses or in
mandatory arbitration clauses. See 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATION & CONTRACTS (BNA)
40:1 (1978) (90% of contracts analyzed have some kind of grounds for discharge provision). Unions
have not insisted, however, on explicit free speech protections. This is not unexpected, due to a kind of
institutional failure. Established unions are as likely to perceive a threat from employee speech as are
employers. See NLRB v. Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322, 325 (1974) (self-interest of incumbent union
would operate to limit § 7 rights); Holodnak v. Avco, 514 F.2d 285, 286-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 892 (1975) (inadequate union support at arbitration hearing for dismissal of employee who
had been critical of union). See also Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 411 (a)(2) (1976)
(granting union members free speech rights within unions). Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976) (Title
VII protects workers from discrimination by union as well as by employers). In only one context have
union leaders endorsed an explicit collective bargaining clause protecting constitutional rights. See
Lynd, Company Constitutionalism?, 87 YALE L.J. 885, 894 (1978) (book review) (citing newspaper
report of campaign for presidency of United Steelworkers of America between incumbent Lloyd Mc-
Bride and dissident Ed Sydlowski).
74. Note, supra note 17, at 1834.
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2. Employer's Freedom of Expression
The First and Fourteenth Amendments also preserve the employer's
rights of free expression from abridgment by government, even when the
employer is an artificial person.75 Governmental protection of employee
speech might violate these rights in two contexts: when the employee's
speech is attributed to the employer, and when the employer exists merely
as a proxy for the views and beliefs of its members.
First Amendment rights may be violated when a government forces a
party to tolerate remarks which a reasonable listener would attribute to
her.76 Such attribution, it is argued, compels the party to abandon her
right of silence and forces her "to participate in the dissemination of an
ideological message." '77 When the employee can be perceived by the rea-
sonable listener as a spokesperson for the employer, the listener might
properly attribute the employee's speech to the employer, thus impairing
the latter's rights of free expression.
Employers have the right to be free from unwanted attribution to them
of ideological messages. Attribution by a reasonable listener depends,
however, on the circumstances of the speech and the rank of the employee.
High-ranking employees are likely to be identified as spokespersons,
whether on or off the job.7" Lower-level employees who act as spokesper-
sons on company time are also likely to be so identified.79 Therefore, these
two types of employees should not ordinarily be protected by government
from employer retaliation. Employees who do not fall into these catego-
ries, however, may be protected without infringing upon the employer's
expressive rights.
The employer's First Amendment rights are also abridged where the
75. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (corporations enjoy a degree
of free speech); Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath and Its Prospects: The Constitu-
tionality of Government Restraints on Political Campaign Financing, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1375
(1976) (after Buckley, no reason why corporations should not be as fully protected as unions and
voluntary associations); Note, The Corporation and the Constitution: Economic Due Process and Cor-
porate Speech, 90 YALE L.J. 1833 (1981) (urging that Bellotti be overturned).
76. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 713 (1977) (Jehovah's Witnesses may not be
convicted for obscuring words "Live Free or Die" on state license plates); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (government may not force schoolchildren to salute and pledge al-
legience to flag).
77. Prunyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 85-87 (1980) (summarizing and af-
firming holding in Wooley).
78. This principle lies behind the denial of First Amendment protection to "policymaking" public
employees. See Mitchell v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 391 (10th Cir. 1976) (governor properly discharged
appointee who disagreed with policy goals); cf Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518-19 (1980) (poli-
cymaking distinguished from non-policymaking in context of patronage dismissals); Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 367-68 (1976) (plurality opinion) (same). There may, however, be circumstances where
high-ranking employees are able to express themselves without identifying the employer. No danger
would exist in these cases.
79. Thus, while a receptionist may not be fired for membership in the Klan, she may be fired for
repeating Klan rhetoric to the firm's callers.
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employer itself is a representative organization. In a society increasingly
dominated by large, intrusive institutions, individuals often find it neces-
sary to band together to make their views known or to protect their indi-
vidual liberties. The right of individuals to express themselves through
amplifying organizations is well established.8 0 Where the employer is an
amplifying organization, its First Amendment rights are proxies for the
expressive and associational rights of its members."1 Governmental regula-
tion interfering with the primary protected purpose of an association sub-
stantially infringes the members' expressive and associational rights, be-
cause employee speech that diverges or distracts from the group's
ideological message may strike at the heart of the group's protected pur-
pose by impairing its ability to persuade.
Restraints on an amplifying association, however, will impermissably
impair its members' associational rights only when such restraints sub-
stantially interfere with the amplifying association's primary protected
purpose. The Supreme Court has found that regulation designed to elimi-
nate racial discrimination, for example, violates no associational right
when applied to a private school that exists to teach ideas or dogma, be-
cause the regulation in no way inhibits the group's primary purpose.'
2 If
the state were to prohibit discrimination by the school on the basis of
employee's ideas or dogma, however, the prohibition would interfere with
the primary purpose of the amplifying group and thus constitute a sub-
stantial infringement of its members' associational rights.
Unlike political or ideological associations, an association that exists
primarily for economic purposes will not suffer substantial impairment of
its associational rights as a result of state protection of employee speech."3
Though such protection should not be extended to employees of political
or ideological associations that exist primarily to amplify the view of their
80. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
81. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459-61 (1958), see Raggi, An Indepen-
dent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1977) (arguing for
independent right of freedom of association).
82. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976) (application of § 1981 to school that
refused admission to black children found not to violate parents' freedom of association: parents have
First Amendment right to send children to school that teaches desireability of racial segregation, but
practice of excluding racial minorities from same institution is not protected by same principle); L.
TRIBE, supra note 42, at 704 (distinguishing between cases where association's protected purpose is
threatened from those where it is not). But see Raggi, supra note 81, at 15-18, 25-26 (criticizing
reasoning in Runyon, but not result). Cf R. WOLFF, B. MOORE, JR., & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE
OF PURE TOLERANCE 88-90, 93-95 (1969) (tolerance which treats dissent and status quo equally is
repressive because status quo will prevail; dissenters will be left harmless and helpless to effect quali-
tative social change).
83. It is possible to distinguish between primarily economic and primarily ideological associations.
See O'Kelley, The Constitutional Rights of Corporations Revisited: Social and Political Expression
and the Corporation after First National Bank v. Bellotti, 67 GEO. L.J. 1347, 1359-66 (1979) (trac-
ing "associational rationale" used to grant First Amendment rights to organizations).
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members and to persuade listeners, protection of employee speech in those
economic associations whose central purpose is not to disseminate an ideo-
logical message will not interfere substantially with the associational
rights of either the employer or its constituents."'
Even when employee speech is not attributable to the employer, and
even when the employer is not an amplifying association, the employer
may still have an interest in employee speech, particularly when it is di-
rectly or indirectly critical of the employer. Arguably, the employer should
be able to demand and receive from every employee a minimum level of
loyalty 8-an intangible faithfulness to collective purposes above and be-
yond the contractual terms of the employment relationship. Loyalty to the
employer's purpose and objectives may be a legitimate part of measuring
job performance,86 especially in the case of high-ranking and policymaking
employees whose duties often are less susceptible to description and mea-
surement.8 7 Low- and middle-level employees, however, who usually have
more specialized tasks and whose job performance is therefore more easily
measurable, should not be required to display the same kind of loyalty.
Indeed, restrictions placed on employee speech in an attempt to foster loy-
alty may have the opposite effect. To the extent that employees fear arbi-
84. Although an employee's criticism of a business employer might result in financial losses to the
employer and thus be an interference with the purpose of the employer, this criticism would not
interfere with the employer's primary protected purpose unless it violated property rights. See supra
pp. 533-35.
85. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) (agent has duty to principal to act
solely for principal's benefit in all matters connected with agency).
Loyalty may also function to stem firm decline. Firms experiencing decline in product quality are
notified of the decline by a combination of "exit"---consumers stop buying the product-and
"voice"-consumers complain about the dissatisfaction. Exit, however, is not sufficient to identify firm
pathologies causing dissatisfaction; voice is also essential. Loyalty operates to deter exit from deteri-
orating firms and activates critical "voice" which aids management in reversing decline. Consumer
loyalty thus operates to identify these pathologies to management. Excessive use of exit without voice
leads to firm failure because management cannot respond quickly enough. Conversely, excessive use of
voice without exit also fails to trigger necessary management response. This theory is more fully set
out in A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE & LOYALTY (1970).
Employees can also identify quality declines. Indeed, employees may possess information vital to
recovery yet unavailable to management through ordinary hierarchical channels. See Boulding, The
Economics of Knowledge and the Knowledge of Economics, 56 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1, 8 (Supp.
1966) (organizational structure almost always produces false images to decision-maker). Employees
are more likely than consumers to feel loyalty to the employer. Moreover, if the firm operates in an
area where employees are scarce, the satisfaction of employees may be as important to the firm's
health as the satisfaction of consumers. Employees are the "consumers" of workplaces, and thus are
the only source of voice capable of stemming decline in the quality of the workplaces.
86. Where loyalty is not essential to measurement of performance, it should not be required. Some
states have made it illegal to require employees either to purchase goods from a particular firm or to
refrain from doing so. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-203 (West 1971); CAL. LABOR CODE §
450 (West 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.03 (1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:963 (West 1964).
87. As managerial discretion increases, the possibility of non-productive behavior also increases.
However, as an employee's position rises in a hierarchy, it may become easier to measure performance
in terms of division or group output for which that employee has responsibility. Thus, high level
employees are not uniformly unmeasureable, and loyalty is therefore not uniformly necessary.
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trary retaliation for their ideas, they will believe themselves unfairly
treated and thus become dissatisfied and disloyal." Criticism of the em-
ployer may represent loyalty to the employer's long-term interests;" such
long-term loyalty depends on freedom of expression.
3. Employer's Freedom from Governmental Intrusion
Employers may also have privacy rights that limit governmental protec-
tion of employee speech. Where the employer is a small family business,
or resembles one in operation, such protection would intrude upon the
constitutionally protected privacy of the individual, the home, and the
family. 0 Those employers that resemble the family should therefore be
spared the intrusion that governmental protection of employee speech
would require. As a business begins to acquire more characteristics of a
corporate bureaucracy and fewer of a family enterprise, however, the em-
ployer's interest in privacy diminishes proportionally."' Thus, by exclud-
ing small employers from employee speech regulations, government can
protect employee speech without infringing upon an employer's constitu-
tional privacy rights.
The existence of countervailing employer rights and interests does not
diminish the importance of employee speech to the system of free expres-
sion. When employee speech can be protected without serious damage to
other protected rights, it should be. Thus, employer interests are not a
88. See J. GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE 151-58 (2d rev. ed. 1971) (motivation of
production, supervisory, clerical, sales workers is mixture of pecuniary and group identification incen-
tives). An employer's ban on speech will preclude the employees' use of voice, or criticism, to promote
recovery from decline. Thus, firm decline cannot be stemmed by employees. Moreover, leaving the
firm, or exit, is made exceedingly difficult by social and economic pressures. See supra notes 39-40.
Where both voice and exit are curbed, repression must occur. Hirschman, supra note 54. Therefore,
while internalized loyalty may operate to stem firm decline, externally-imposed loyalty is merely
repression.
89. See A. Hirschman, supra note 85. Disloyalty to the employer also may result from a higher
loyalty to the community or to the public. Comment B of § 387 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY (1958) provides:
The agent is also under a duty not to act or speak disloyally, except in the protection of his
own interests or those of others. He is not, however, necessarily prevented from acting in good
faith outside his employment in a manner which injuriously affects his principal's business.
(Emphases added.)
Indeed, federal law encourages such disloyalty in some contexts. Several federal statutes prohibit em-
ployer reprisal for disclosing violations of the statutes. See, e.g., Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1)-(3) (Supp. III 1979); Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15
U.S.C. § 2622(a)-(e) (1976). For a list of some of the existing federal and state statutes, see WHISTLE-
BLOWING: LOYALTY AND DISSENT IN THE CORPORATION 173 (A. Westin ed. 1981).
90. T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 682. Modern Supreme Court decisions, see, e.g., Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-565 (1969) (right of privacy in home); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482-84 (1965) (grounding federal right of privacy in First Amendment), have found a federal
right of individual privacy protecting the home and family. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733, 785 (1964) (recognizing need for "zone of privacy for each individual beyond which neither
government nor private power can push").
91. T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 682.
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complete barrier to enhanced protection of expressive rights in the private
sector; rather, they must be balanced against the need for such
protection.2
III. Standards and Institutions for Employee Speech Protection
Policy concerns and countervailing constitutional rights do not by them-
selves create the specific legal rules necessary for effective protection of
employee speech; nor do they suggest the governmental institutions most
appropriate for such activity. Existing guarantees in state constitutions
provide the best foundation for protection of private employee speech. In
implementing these guarantees, state courts should employ a two-part in-
quiry, culminating in a balancing test, to determine the proper standard to
apply.
A. A Legal Basis for Protection of Employee Speech
State constitutions were drafted not to limit federal power but to protect
individual liberty."3 Indeed, thirty-nine state constitutions affirmatively
protect freedom of speech in comprehensive terms that do not suggest
mere limitations on governmental action. 4 This breadth is not merely for-
tuitous; the principles of state action, growing primarily out of a concern
for states' rights and federalism, are not applicable to enforcement of state
92. See T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 8 (society may not promote other goals by suppressing
beliefs or opinions of individual members); d. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112
(1956) (accommodation between employees' § 7 rights and employer's property rights must be made
"with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintainance of the other").
93. See, e.g., R. RANKIN, STATE CONSTITUTIONS: THE BILL OF RIGHTS 4-5 (1960); Grad, The
State Bill of Rights, in 7 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: NATIONAL AND STATE 117, 118
(1980). While the federal constitution grants power to the federal government, states possess all sover-
eign powers except as limited by the state constitutions. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74, 84 (1980) (states are "possessed of residual authority that enables [them] to define
property in the first instance"); c. THE FEDERALIST, No. 84 (A. Hamilton) (the people are sovereign;
they retain all power not granted to state).
94. Most provisions take the form: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." N.Y. CONST., art. I § 8 (McKin-
ney 1968). For a list of the 41 states conforming to this affirmative model, see Note, Private Abridg-
ment of Speech and the State Constitutions, 90 YALE L.J. 165, 180 n.79 (1980). The language of the
New York constitution resembles the comprehensive terms of the Thirteenth Amendment, which pro-
vides that "[nleither slavery nor involuntary servitude. . . shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S. CONST. amend. 13, § 1. Although federal enforcement of
other amendments has been limited by the application of the state action doctrine based on the terms
of those amendments, federal enforcement of the Thirteenth amendment extends beyond non-govern-
mental affairs. Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional Enforcement of the
Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REV. 479, 550-57 (1975).
One state appellate judge has recognized the potential of a state constitutional free expression clause
to protect against wrongful discharge. See Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital, 88 Ill. App. 3d 994, 1008,
411 N.E.2d 50 (1980) (dissenting opinion) (questioning whether case at bar makes out instance of
retaliatory discharge on basis of controverted facts, but indicating belief in possibility).
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constitutions.9" Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that federal with-
drawal from the field of private abridgement is itself a strong reason for
states to protect expressive activity.96 Several states have ignored the pub-
lic-private dichotomy when applying their own constitutional provisions. 7
Even those state constitutions that merely restrict legislative action in pro-
visions similar to the First Amendment98 have not yet been interpreted
extensively or limited explicitly to public actors." Affirmative constitu-
tional limitations thus might be implied, as non-textual limitations have
been in Delaware. 10 ' The Supreme Court has made it clear that a state
may protect free speech beyond the scope of the First Amendment, even
beyond the scope of public actors."°1
Constitutional protection of private employees' expressive rights is more
appropriate than is common-law protection, which is overruled too easily
by legislative fiat. 10 2 Freedom of expression has always relied upon an
independent judiciary with constitutional power to protect individual
95. See Yackle, supra note 94, at 484-85 (state action doctrine promotes states rights by drawing a
line between affairs governed by states and those subject to federal intervention). Concern for states
rights, often thought of as the excuse rather than the reason for opposition to federal anti-slavery
statutes, are the explicit grounds on which the state action doctrine was founded. See The Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-13, 17-18 (1883).
96. Note, supra note 94, at 177. It might be argued that employees enjoying the protection of § 7
could not benefit from state constitutional protections because claims of unfair labor practices are
preempted by the NLRA. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). The
Supreme Court has recently found, however, that a state-law claim that could not be presented to the
NLRB is not preempted. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1978) (claim
of common law trespass). Because a claim based on a state constitution cannot be brought before the
NLRB, the area is not preempted. A conflict would exist, however, in some cases. See Emporium
Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50 (1975) (doctrine of exclusiv-
ity requires employees protesting employer's raciai discrimination to first win union backing).
97. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341
(1979), afi'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (no mention of state action doctrine when interpreting state free
speech clause to protect against private abridgment of speech), ef Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45
N.Y.2d 152, 379 N.E.2d 1169 (1978) (ignoring state action doctrine when applying state due process
requirements to private garage).
98. The states are Hawaii, Indiana, Oregon, South Carolina, Utah, West Virginia. See Note,
supra note 94, at 182 n.87.
99. Note, supra note 94, at 178. But see Note, supra note 94, at 178 n.64 (some states have
implicitly adopted federal doctrine of state action by interpreting their speech provisions in pan
materia with First amendment).
100. Cf State v. Ceci, 255 A.2d 700 (Del. Super. Ct. 1969) (implying free speech protection
although only free press clause appears in state constitution).
101. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
102. Further, common law reform along the lines of "wrongful discharge" doctrine merely pro-
vides a clause for contracts in which no term is negotiated. Employers need merely include a waiver of
the clause in a standard contract to avoid common law liability. But see Note, supra note 17, at 1833
n.91 (arguing that courts might still refuse to enforce such clauses). Moreover, the common law may
be particularly unsuited to protection of free speech, as speech cannot be valued in economic terms.
Cf Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV. 757, 764 (1975) (logic of law is really
economics; common law revolves around economic principles). But see Schwartz, Tort Law and the
Economy in Nineteenth-Century America: A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1721, 1775 (1981)
(empirical study shows tort law not singlemindedly geared to promoting economic efficiency).
Employee Speech
rights from majoritarian suppression,1 3 constitutional protection being
most appropriate for those interests inadequately protected by
majoritarian institutions. Because speech requiring protection usually is
unpopular, it is not unexpected that democratically controlled legislatures
fail to respond adequately.104
Total reliance on constitutional schemes, however, presents other diffi-
culties. Constitutional doctrine can become prematurely inflexible unless
significant case law has developed.' Moreover, courts might not be prop-
erly equipped to analyze the economic interests involved in the balancing
of employer and employee rights.'
But courts protecting private employees' speech under state constitu-
tions need not proceed without any guidance. They may rely on analogous
case law protecting public employees' speech and interpreting section 7 of
the NLRA. °7 They also may receive support from legislative action
within appropriate spheres. The judiciary is capable of clearly separating
the different variables that lead to the result in a given case, distinguishing
those that the constitution requires from those that it does not. The legis-
lature thus may be invited to establish presumptions for certain of these
non-constitutional variables, the range of which, despite rudimentary con-
stitutional limits, is still broad. For example, a legislature might establish
presumptions concerning the definition either of "small business" with an
eye to promoting employee harmony within constitutional limits,' or of
activities constituting "disruption of work."'0 9
103. See T. EMERSON, supra note 1, at 13; Note, supra note 94, at 178. See also Deutsch, Neu-
trality, Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20
STAN. L. REV. 169, 242 (1968) (reasons to favor courts over legislatures when deciding constitutional
issues).
104. J. ELY, supra note 44; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 43. Even Professor Wellington, who
argues against constitutional remedies to limit non-governmental institutions, see note 1, supra, admits
that "[c]onstitutiona restraints could be effective limitations on union or corporate power in areas
involving the treatment of employees and of those seeking work in an enterprise." Wellington, supra
note 1, at 348-49 (footnote omitted); c. M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1966) ("in the free speech area, the Supreme Court (properly) represents
some interests groups while other government agencies represent others."). Moreover, reliance on
majoritarian institutions may be unwise in this instance. Competition among state legislatures for
business development is not unknown in American history. See Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-
64, 559 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (describing changes in corporation law of various states:
"The race was one not of diligence but of laxity.")
105. Cf Deutsch, supra note 103 (flexibility helps reduce conflict between judicial and public
opinions, alleviating counter-majoritarian friction).
106. Cf Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979) ("Prediction of profitability is essentially a
matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform.")
107. One author has concluded that, due to the doctrinal borrowing between the protections ac-
corded to the speech of public and organized private employees, the approaches of the two are now
nearly indistinguishable. Lynd, supra note 8, at 712, 754.
108. See note 128 infra (discussing presumptions based on size of employer).
109. Indeed, legislatures may wish to establish administrative agencies similar to the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission or the National Labor Relations Board. Although final determi-
nation of the constitutional issue may perhaps not be left with a non-judicial entity, cf Alexander v.
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B. Toward Determining the Limits of Employee Speech
A two-step procedure highlights in broad strokes the issues that courts
must address when deciding employee speech cases. The procedure first
eliminates the enforcement of certain employee claims that would violate
the employer's constitutional rights and then identifies the issues to be
balanced in the remainder of the cases.11
1. Threshold Issues
A threshold test for enforcement of employee speech rights should elim-
inate those cases in which any enforcement would significantly impair the
employer's federally protected interests. A threshold test is necessary to
avoid state violation of federally guaranteed rights. The First Amendment
right to freedom of association precludes protection of free speech when
the employer exists primarily to amplify the views of its members or to
protect their individual liberty.' Respect for the integrity of our system
of self-government and for the protection of freedom of expression itself
requires that political associations remain largely unrestrained. These am-
plifying enterprises are characterized by an ideological viewpoint shared
by all members; the enterprise engages primarily in expression and sees
amplification of that ideological viewpoint as its most important pur-
pose."1 Organizations like the Ku Klux Klan, the Moral Majority, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the NAACP, political campaign commit-
tees, and the Republican and Communist parties all qualify as amplifying
entities. Business corporations and labor unions, however, which are or-
ganized primarily to wield economic power, would not qualify. Newspa-
pers that exist primarily to disseminate ideas but not ideology would like-
wise fail the test. Small employers should also be excluded from state
constitutional proscriptions by virtue of the resemblance of their structure
and operations to the truly private affairs of family and home."'
This threshold test would eliminate most violations of employers' con-
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44-47 (1974) (unanimous) (finding arbitration an inappropriate
forum for final determination of rights guaranteed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and requiring
courts to determine question de novo), courts may find useful an administrative determination of a
component matter such as the extent of employer loss. Indeed, those states that already have labor
relations boards or employment discrimination commissions might wish to assign these determinations
to those experienced bodies. Moreover, arbitration could also consider this constitutional issue. J.
GETMAN, supra note 19, at 369-70; Palmer, supra note 19, at 170.
110. The proposed procedure relies heavily on public employee precedent. For doctrinal summa-
ries, see R. O'NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (1978); Lynd, supra note 8; Van
Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841 (1970).
111. See supra pp. 538-39.
112. See O'Kelley, supra note 83.
113. See supra p. 540. Legislative action would be particularly helpful in the context of defining
"small business" beyond the constitutional privacy standard set by the courts.
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stitutional rights. Because the threshold test operates to deprive employees'
speech of constitutional protections, the employer should have the burdens
of proof and persuasion. Moreover, the kinds of information required by
the test-description of the organization's size and purpose-are more
easily obtained and presented by the employer."'
2. Issues to Weigh in the Balance
A balancing of additional interests is next required to ensure both mini-
mal infringement upon relevant employer rights and maximum protection
of employee speech rights. ' In performing this balancing, courts should
consider the relation of the speech to the employee's job, its nature, and its
disruptive effect on the employee's or employer's work.
a. Relation of Speech to Job
The balancing of employee speech rights against employer rights should
also consider the relationship of the speech to the job performed by the
employee speaker. The employer's interest in regulating employee speech
should decrease as the speech becomes less related to the employee's job.
Public employees enjoy protection that makes a similar calculation.'
1 6
Under this standard, for example, absent unusual circumstances, a switch-
board operator's membership in the Ku Klux Klan, an assembly-line
worker's affiliation with the Communist party, or a non-defense em-
ployee's degree of loyalty to the nation could not be a basis for employer
retaliation.
114. Cf Blades, supra note 1, at 1427-31 (discussing problems and burdens of proof in actions
between employers and employees); Note, Free Speech and Impermissible Motive in the Dismissal of
Public Employees, 89 YALE L.J. 376 (1979) (recommending change in standard of proof used in cases
involving speech of public employees and recommending "substantial evidence" standard, primarily
due to imbalance favoring employer in allocation of burden of proof).
115. See supra note 92.
116. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-73 (1968) (government, as employer, has
no interest at all in speech that has little impact on speaker's job performance); cf. Pilkington v.
Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465, 478 n.1 1 (D.R.I. 1977), a1fd per curium, 590 F.2d 386 (ist Cir. 1979)
(public employee's right to First Amendment protection under Pickering justifiably based on rights
qua employee as well as qua citizen); Blades, supra note 1, at 1406 (employer should not be allowed
to exercise control over "innumerable facets of employee's life that have little or no relevance to the
employment relationship"). Lower courts have required that reasons for dismissal of public employees
be "narrowly related to the effective performance" of the employee's duties. See Sponick v. Detroit
Police Dept., 49 Mich. App. 162, 211 N.W.2d 674 (1973). Thus, courts have overturned dismissals
based upon employee advocacy of homosexuality, see Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir.
1969), and have held that a police department may not refuse to hire an applicant because he legally
practices nudism in his off-hours, see Bruns v. Pomerleau, 319 F. Supp. 58 (D. Md. 1970).
A court may also wish to consider the greater value of the speech to the public if the employee, due
to her position within the entity, is the only source for the information or position espoused. Con-
versely, greater harm might be done to the entity if the position or information is faulty and the
employer cannot easily correct the inaccuracy. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572
(1968).
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When an employee is reasonably percieved as a spokesperson for the
employer, the employee's speech is too closely related to her job to be
protected, for such protection would violate the employer's own First
Amendment rights."1 7 Those high-ranking policymaking employees who
ordinarily would be reasonably perceived as spokespersons, and official
spokespersons should be required to serve at the pleasure of the employer.
Exercise of professional judgment, however, should not operate to deny
expressive rights unless the professional determines the policies of the
enterprise. '
b. Nature of the Speech
Special value of the speech to the employee or to the public should
weigh in favor of its protection, although such value admittedly will be
subjective and difficult to gauge. Speech that has observable value to either
the speaker or the public is worthy of protection, for it clearly promotes
two of the underlying reasons for freedom of expression: self-realization
for the speaker and informed decisionmaking by the electorate."' Because
of this standard's subjective nature, however, the absence of observable
value to the public or to the speaker should not weigh against protection
of the employee's speech.1
20
The fact that employee's statements are erroneous should weigh against
their protection only when the statements are both unrelated to the job
and knowingly and recklessly false.12' Protecting even false statements
may promote the advancement of knowledge and the discovery of truth.
22
117. See supra p. 537.
118. Cf Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1980) (finding patronage dismissal improper
where employee, a federal public defender, had significant powers of discretion but no responsibility
for policies of agency).
119. See supra p. 529 (discussing values underlying freedom of expression).
120. Public employees are judged by a standard that includes consideration of the value of the
speech. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968) (speech rights protect free and
open decisionmaking vital to electorate). Pickering has occasionally been interpreted to limit speech
protection to those issues important to the electorate-to issues concerning a matters of public concern.
See Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d 1364, 1367-69 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
921 (1976) (non-tenured professor alleged that employer's failure to renew contract resulted from
speech activity; court finds "reduced protection" for "private communications" of teacher). The Su-
preme Court, however, has found "private expression of one's views" deserving of protection as well.
Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414, 415-16 (1979) (unanimous)
(teacher's remarks to employer critical of school district, uttered in private encounters, found
protected).
121. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). The test has been used
in formulating doctrines relating to both public and private employee'speech. See Pickering v. Board
of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573-74 (1968); Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53,
65 (1966) (Sullivan used not because of "constitutional compulsion" but only to give full effect to
legislative intent of § 7 of NLRA).
122. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("erroneous statement is
inevitable in free debate, and . . . must be protected if the freedoms of expression are to have the
Employee Speech
Therefore, the malicious intent test of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 12
should be employed in deciding employee speech cases. Only when speech
is maliciously false should its falsity weigh against the employee's interest
in free expression.
c. Disruption of Work
Courts further should consider whether employee speech results in tan-
gible disruption of work. An employer must be able to require employees
to obey instructions and to work effectively with their colleagues; 12 an
employee's refusal to obey or inability to function as a part of a team can
significantly impair the achievement of the employer's objectives. In order
adequately to protect employer interests, therefore, the balancing must re-
flect an evaluation of whether the expressive activity disrupted work.1"5
Indeed, an employer's time, place and manner restrictions are reasonable
only to the extent that they are necessary to minimize disruption.2 6
Nevertheless, the term "disruption" can describe almost any activity
that the employer dislikes, and any expression is likely to be a minor
disruption. Adequate protection of employee speech, therefore, requires
that only material and substantial disruptions' 27 be heavily considered in
the balance.2 2 Further, adequate protection of employer perogatives re-
'breathing space' that they 'need . . . to survive'") (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433
(1963)).
123. 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
124. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 570 (1968) (recognizing need for obedience
and "harmony among co-workers"); Blumberg, supra note 1, at 318 (obedience is "essential").
125. To the extent that employers have suffered losses amounting to a "taking," employee speech
cannot be protected by government. The threshold test followed by consideration of "disruption" will
ensure that no taking occurs. See supra pp. 533-37.
126. Cf Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 (1945) (approving NLRB
presumptions that time, place and manner restrictions are unreasonable unless shown to be "necessary
in order to maintain production or discipline).
127. While Pickering suggested that insubordination and disharmony should be considered in the
balance, most lower courts have replaced these factors with a test for material and substantial disrup-
tion, based on Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969). See
Lynd, supra note 8, at 736. Thus, activities involving only minor disruptions, such as making "ill-
considered personal remark[s]" to a future superior, DeLuca v. Sullivan, 450 F. Supp. 736, 740 (D.
Mass. 1977), filing a lawsuit to challenge the election of superiors, Gomez v. Board of Educ., 85
N.M. 708, 516 P.2d 679 (1973), or calmly but publicly criticizing superiors, Dendor v. Board of Fire
& Police Commissioners, 11 Ill. App. 3d 582, 297 N.E.2d 316 (1973), have all been protected when
balanced against the employers' interests. Courts have also reversed dismissals based solely on the
failure of co-workers to "weather minor upsets" provoked by the dismissed employee. See Common-
wealth ex rel. Rafferty v. Philadelphia Psychiatric Center, 356 F. Supp. 500, 508-09 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Conversely, where speech has substantially and materially disrupted the work of the organization, it
has often been unprotected. Thus, employees in psychotherapeutic wards at Veteran's Hospitals have
been prohibited to wear small pins registering their opposition to war because this expression could
impede the recovery of recent veterans, see Smith v. United States, 502 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1974),
and probation officers have been prohibited to display posters suggesting admiration for unap-
prehended but wanted criminals, see Phillips v. Adult Probation Dept., 491 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1974).
These expressive activities would substantially disrupt the work of the organization.
128. Note that the concern for harmony among co-workers, as comprehended by the concept of
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quires that the speech must substantially be the cause of the retaliation. 29
In the private sector, "substantial disruption" should include fighting at
work,13 persistent interruption of co-workers causing them seriously to
threaten to resign,' and persistent direct refusal to obey reasonable or-
ders.132 "Insubstantial disruption" should include calmly criticizing opera-
tions and procedures," 3 advising an employee of her legal rights against
the employer,134 implying that an employer is racially biased,131 or engag-
ing in an "unprofessional outburst" in the office of a superior.'36 To the
extent that any lost value is great enough to amount to a taking, and to
the extent that an employer can directly trace such lost value to particular
instances of employee speech, the loss should be considered in the thresh-
old. 37 Substantial loss of value can also be considered a serious disruption
of the employer's enterprise.
Conclusion
The speech of public employees currently is protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and that of union members when furthering
disruption, may lend itself to certain presumptions based upon the size of the employer. As an em-
ployer's size decreases, it becomes less possible to create segregated groups of like-minded employees.
Ideological differences may engender tensions so destructive that teamwork becomes impossible. Fur-
ther, the importance of teamwork to the firm's operations is likely to increase as the size of the firm
decreases.
A presumption based upon the size of the employer would be a beneficial surrogate for the har-
mony concern. Such a presumption would have the great advantage of promoting certainty in an area
where courts might be slow to develop a predictable standard. Moreover, employers would find the
presumption easily translatable into guidelines for use in their self-policing efforts. Thus, burdensome
quantities of litigation could be avoided. In this way, small firms that are not family-operated and
therefore unprotected by the constitutional right to privacy might yet be protected by a presumption
against enforcement of employee speech rights based upon a constitutional concern for worker
harmony.
129. When fashioning standards for employee speech, courts must consider the burden of persua-
sion. Employers defending against employee charges of speech-provoked retaliation are likely to allege
that the employee would have suffered the same fate regardless of the speech. A "but for" test, which
requires the employee to show that the employer had no other reason besides speech-provoked retalia-
tion, will unduly favor the employer. See Note, supra note 114, at 393 (defects of "but for" causation
should lead courts to employ "substantial cause" test when deciding public employee speech cases).
But cf Mt. Healthy City School District Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977) (applying but-
for test of causation).
130. See, e.g., Edwards v. Foucar, Ray & Simon, Inc., 24 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,208, at
17,360 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (fighting with superior); Sexton v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 17 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) % 8452, at 6349 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (fighting among salesmen on sales floor).
131. See Taylor v. Franklin Drapery, 441 F. Supp. 279, 295-97 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
132. Cf Gonzalez v. Bolger, 22 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 30,731, at 14,769 (D.D.C. 1980)
(postal employee).
133. See supra note 29.
134. See supra note 34.
135. See supra note 36.
136. See Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 17 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 1 8453, at 6350 (E.D. Mich.
1978).
137. See supra pp. 533-36.
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concerted activity, by the NLRA. Although federal courts have refused to
apply the First Amendment to private employment relationships, the
broader guarantees of provisions in state constitutions are suited to supply
such protection. By developing a test that balances the employee's interest
in free expression against the protected interests of the employer, state
courts can intervene to protect employee speech without violating the em-
ployer's rights.138
Such a balancing test is the most appropriate way both to consider the
many factors involved in employee speech cases and to insure that result-
ing doctrines remain flexible until a significant body of case law has devel-
oped. Such flexibility could be detrimental to the system of free expres-
sion, however, if applied inconsistently by courts according to their
subjective respect for the content of the expression."' Indeed, unpopular
speech is the type most in need of protection. The elements of the test
must be applied, therefore, with full cognizance of both the underlying
purposes of free expression and the difficulties of ferreting out abuses of
the system of free expression within the employment relationship.'
138. Remedies in such cases need not be limited to reinstatement. See Sherman, Reinstatement as
a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Countries, 29 AM. J. COMP. L. 467, 506-507
(1981) (majority of all common market nations recognize appropriateness of reinstatement as a poten-
tial remedy but also have laws providing for monetary compensation). Reinstatement, however, is
occasionally a worthwhile remedy. See McDermott & Newhams, Discharge-Reinstatement: What
Happens Thereafter, 24 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 526 (1971) (empirical study showing employer and
employee satisfaction following reinstatement; few employees discharged second time); Glendon &
Lev, supra note 39, at 462 (increased popularity of reinstatement as arbitration award). See generally
Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Eficient Remedy, 56 IND. L.J. 207 (1981).
139. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 42,
at 53-56 (criticizing balancing test for vagueness); L. TRIBE,, supra note 42, at 583-84 (same). But see
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, supra note 42, at 438 (most commenta-
tors accept balancing, though often as a last resort). Balancing is made less distasteful by limiting the
terms that may be weighed. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 935-48 (1968) (endors-
ing limited balancing test over "ad hoc" balancing test).
140. The low public visibility of the private employment relationship requires such examination.
Cf. T. EMERSON, supra note 2, at 163 (low visibility of administrative decisions make "the imagined
impact of the restrictions . . . the most repressive feature of all").
